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This paper presents a game theoretical model that addresses the trade off between regional 
coordination and incentives in the mediation of unemployed in the Netherlands. 
Due to yardstick competition, municipalities have financial incentives to reduce unemployment, 
but are not likely to cooperate with each other to have the scale advantages of a regional labour 
market. On the other hand, a regional public employment service, like the CWI in the 
Netherlands, has a higher probability and value of matching, but it lacks the incentives to exert 
the optimal mediation effort. The model is calibrated with information on vacancies and CWI 
clients for the Netherlands, in order to get an impression whether it is optimal to have a public 
employment service in the context of this model. Finally, various institutional settings, like a 
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1  Introduction
1 
1.1  Employment Services in the Netherlands 
During the last five years the administration of social security in the Netherlands has been 
changed substantially. The changes are the result of two new laws. Firstly, on January 1, 2002 
the new social security act SUWI
2 was introduced (see for more information the box “SUWI & 
CWI”). This act aimed at a more distinctive distribution of social security activities among 
public organisations and employer and employee organisations. One of the most notable 
features of the new act is the establishment of the new public employment service CWI
3. 
During the first six months of unemployment the CWI helps the unemployed finding a job, 
mostly by offering mediation services. Most CWI offices cover a number of municipalities; in 
large cities the CWI office covers only one or part of a municipality. Secondly, the new social 
assistance act WWB
4, introduced in 2004, sets out the organisation and financing of social 
assistance. Decision-making is decentralised and municipalities receive a fixed amount from the 
central government for the payment of the benefits. The transfers from the government are 
based on yardstick competition. Yardstick competition relates the performance of a 
municipality to other municipalities. Outperforming other municipalities leads to financial 
gains, since the lump sum amount is based on the average performance of all municipalities.
5 
Municipalities can retain any amounts saved on unemployment benefits. Therefore, they have a 
strong incentive to reduce the number of social assistance recipients. 
Early evaluations of the WWB show that the increase in welfare benefits is around 2 percent 
lower as a result of yardstick competition and more unemployed found a job.
6 So the financing 
structure indeed gives the municipalities an incentive to reduce unemployment. Also the SUWI 
act has been evaluated recently.
7 Although the situation is better than before the introduction of 
the law, there are still problems in the coordination between the various organisations. In this 
thesis I address the lack of coordination in employment services between the CWI and the 
municipalities.  
 
1 This thesis was written during an internship at the CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. I would like 
thank my supervisors Paul de Bijl and Pierre Koning from the CPB and Sander Onderstal from the University of Amsterdam 
for their critical support and Luuk Buit and Roel van Elk for their help on form and contents. I am grateful to seminar 
participants at the CPB and Klaas Beniers from the Ministry of Social Affairs for valuable comments. 
2 In Dutch: Structuur Uitvoeringsorganisatie Werk en Inkomen; SUWI 
3 In Dutch: Centrum voor Werk en Inkomen 
4 In Dutch: Wet Werk en Bijstand 
5 See for example Shleifer (1985) 
6 See Stegeman and Van Vuren (2006) and Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2007) 
7 See Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2006)  
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Multiple organisations perform the mediation tasks. The CWI mediates, while the 
municipalities perform administration tasks and re-integration after the first six months of 
unemployment. The municipalities have a strong financial incentive to reduce the number of 
unemployed, but the municipalities do not directly control the mediation of the unemployed 
during the first six months of unemployment. When helping unemployed to find a job, the CWI 
does not take into account that municipalities gain from the effort of the CWI as there are no 
returns to job matches as the municipalities have. The mediation effort of the CWI is lower than 
the municipalities would opt for if they were responsible for the mediation task.
9 
A possible solution to this problem is to transfer the mediation task in the first half year of 
unemployment to the municipalities as well.
10 Former state secretary of Social Affairs Rutte 
 
8 See CWI (2007) 
9 See Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2007b, p.66) 
10 In practice, not only the CWI collects vacancies, also municipalities may search for vacancies for their own unemployed in 
order to gain from the lower expenditures on social benefits. See Section 6. 
SUWI & CWI explained 
On 1 January, 2002 the new social security act SUWI was introduced. The basic structure is as follows. There are 132 
CWI offices in the Netherlands. Most CWI offices cover a number of municipalities, some cover one or part of a 
municipality. A benefit applicant goes to the CWI to apply for a benefit. If he meets the requirements, the CWI will 
register him. If the applicant is disabled or has worked enough in the past, he is eligible for an unemployment insurance. 
The public organisation UWV pays the insurance. If he is not disabled nor has worked enough in the past, he is eligible 
for a social assistance benefit. The municipality where he lives pays him the benefit. 
During the first six months of unemployment the CWI will help the unemployed to find a job. The help of the CWI takes 
the form of extensive mediation: the unemployed can have consults with a CWI worker and he can look into the vacancy 
section in the CWI offices and at the website of the CWI. The CWI is responsible for monitoring unemployment benefit 
recipients in this period. Most of the unemployed find a job within this period. In the first quarter of 2007 64% of the 
unemployed found a job within the first six months of unemployment.
8 
If the unemployed has not found a job after the first six months, the municipalities or the CWI become responsible for 
the employment services. Their support is more intensive and often re-integration into the labour market is necessary.  
The central government finances the CWI and UWV. The financing does not depend on their results. Since the 
introduction of the new social assistance act in 2004 the amounts the municipalities receive are partly based on their 
results.   
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proposed this in 2003.
11 Still, although this proposal solves the incentive problem, it creates 
another problem: lack of regional coordination.
12 
Regional coordination on the labour market is important in the social security system and is 
one of the reasons for the creation of the CWI.
13 
14 Since workers and vacancies are 
heterogeneous, employers, job seekers and overall welfare benefit from a labour market which 
is larger than the local labour markets. The number of relevant vacancies the CWI has available 
is larger than an individual municipality has available for their own unemployed. Moreover, in 
general when there are more vacancies available a worker can be matched to a job with better 
fitting characteristics. Therefore, the CWI increases allocative efficiency in the labour market. 
If the municipalities coordinate their activities by sharing vacancies they found but cannot 
match to their own unemployed, they will create a regional labour market without the CWI. 
However, it is uncertain whether the municipalities will share the unused vacancies. Ministerie 
van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2007b) quotes a local civil servant: “There is a tension 
between local and regional policies. Good matching requires regional policies. [...] There is 
competition between municipalities.”
15 If the municipalities do not cooperate, they cannot 
benefit from the regional labour market. Another possibility in the absence of the CWI is that 
the municipalities set up a regional employment office themselves. But the municipalities still 
have an incentive to favour their own unemployed. The municipalities should discipline 
themselves in advance by rules that ensure the independence of the employment office. This 
leads to a comparable principal-agent problem as between the municipalities and the CWI. 
From the discussion about the relation between the CWI and the municipalities a trade off 
emerges. At the one hand, in the current situation the CWI facilitates the formation of a regional 
labour market, but it does not have the incentives to provide the optimal mediation effort like 
the municipalities. On the other hand, the municipalities have financial incentives to reduce 
unemployment, but they are unlikely to cooperate to form a regional labour market. So only one 
of two goals can be reached: the CWI has the advantage of coordination; the municipalities 
have the advantage of incentives. 
The current government wants to “stimulate the CWI, UWV and municipalities to 
coordinate their activities and to improve the quality and effectiveness of the services and re-
integration by result agreements.”
16 This should lead to 190 million EUR savings annually on 
the costs of the social security system. This thesis can contribute to the ongoing discussion 
about the design of the social security system and about the role of the CWI in this process.  
 
11 See Volkskrant, 13 August 2003 
12 Another problem is that small municipalities might not have the skills to perform the mediation task. I do not discuss this 
issue in my thesis. 
13 See for example Raad voor Werk en Inkomen (2006) 
14 See Het Financieele Dagblad, 23 June 2006 
15 Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2007b, p.67) 
16 See www.kabinetsformatie20062007.nl  
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1.2  Research Question and Methodology 
The previous discussion leads to my research question: 
 
Given that the WWB act implies that municipalities are lump sum financed, what yields higher 
welfare: municipalities providing the employment services or a regional public employment 
service doing so?  
 
My research method is to model the effect of incentives and coordination on unemployment and 
welfare. I split the employment services in two categories: searching for vacancies and the 
matching process. My model deals only with searching and matching activities on the labour 
market that make use of the mediation services of the employment office. So I ignore the efforts 
of (un-)employed and firms themselves to find each other. 
In my model there are two municipalities which both have one unemployed and in both 
jurisdictions one vacancy can be found. I consider two setups. In the first setup the 
municipalities look for vacancies, try to match the vacancies to their own unemployed and have 
to decide whether they want to share vacancies they themselves have not used. I show that the 
municipalities will not exchange their unused vacancies, so the regional labour market will not 
function. In the second setup a Public Employment Service (PES), like the CWI, searches for 
the vacancies. The PES is less effective in searching than the municipalities. This reflects the 
proposition that the PES does not have the optimal incentives. The vacancies and unemployed 
are pooled and, if possible, matched. The probability a match will occur is larger in the common 
pool than when the municipalities match their unemployed and vacancies. I find an expression 
that shows for what value of the variables the welfare levels of the setup with and without a 
PES are the same. The optimal setup depends on two central parameters: the effectiveness of 
search and the effectiveness of matching. 
I extend my model in several directions. In the first extension I consider the effects if the 
game is played more than once. Next I consider the effects when I lift the assumption that the 
municipalities have one unemployed and at most one vacancy. Both extensions point to ways to 
increase the realism of the model. A first conclusion is that the advantage of the regional labour 
market is smaller than predicted in the basic model, because both coordination between 
municipalities and a larger size of the labour market increase the attractiveness of the setup 
where the municipalities perform the mediation task themselves. In a third extension I include 
the costs of searching in the model. Economies of scale increase the attractiveness of a setup 
with a PES. 
I calibrate my model using information from the Dutch statistical office, from the CWI and 
from the literature. This calibration gives an impression of the advantage of the PES over the  
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municipalities in providing the employment services, stemming from the value of a regional 
labour market. 
The model can be applied to other economic issues than described in this thesis. For 
example the re-integration market for long-term unemployed in the Netherlands shows a similar 
trade off as in the mediation sector for short-term unemployed. The difference is the current 
situation: in the re-integration sector the municipalities are responsible for the employment 
services, so the incentives are well aligned. However, they might not coordinate their activities 
regionally. Another application is joint research centres. Firms can save on costs if they set up a 
joint research centre, but if there are moral hazard problems between the participating firms, 
they may not create a joint research centre without coordination. On the other hand, an 
independent research centre might have lower incentives to do research than the firms would 
like. 
1.3  Structure of the Thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. An overview of the relevant literature is 
given in Section 2. In Section 0 I develop the model. In Section 4 I consider some extensions to 
the basic model. I calibrate the model of Section 0 in Section 5. I conclude in Section 6 in 
which I also discuss the possibilities for future research and present some policy options.  
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2  Literature 
In this section I discuss the literature that is related to my thesis. The model which I develop in 
Section 3 builds on concepts from search and matching models and non cooperative game 
theory. Furthermore, my research is related to literature on the performance of the public 
employment service (PES) and active labour market policies and to literature dealing with 
issues about the regional labour market. In this section I show what the relation is between my 
research and existing literature. In Section 2.1 I discuss the search and matching models. 
Section 2.2 discusses the role of non cooperative game theory in my model. Section 2.3 shows 
the place of my research within the literature about the performance of the PES and about the 
regional labour market. In Section 2.4 I conclude and show what my model adds to the existing 
literature. 
2.1  Search and Matching Models 
My thesis combines search and matching models with game theory. 
Search and matching models examine the matching process on the labour market.
17 The 
labour market is not seen as an aggregate market where workers and jobs are matched 
instantaneously, but as a market where workers and jobs have to search for each other and meet 
pair-wise to see whether the other is acceptable. This process of searching and matching takes 
time and therefore causes unemployment. The number of matches on the labour market is 
explained by a matching function which relates the number of matches to the number of 
vacancies and unemployed and to exogenous variables.
18 Also in my model the matching 
function is a central instrument to explain unemployment. The important exogenous variable in 
my model is the institutional design of the employment services. Whether the employment 
services are provided by the municipalities or by a regional employment office determines both 
the number of available vacancies and the effectiveness of the matching process.  
Contrary to standard search and matching models I ignore the behaviour of unemployed and 
firms in order to be able to focus on the role of the employment office. This has two 
implications. First, my model deals only with part of all search and matching activity on the 
labour market. Second, the wage-bargaining process and the value from matching for workers 
and firms are ignored. Only value for the government is considered and the value from 
matching results from lower expenditures on welfare benefits. Another difference is that my 
model does not seek to explain the job creation and job destruction process. Therefore, it takes 
the number of vacancies and unemployed as given. Unlike in most papers on the matching 
function, my model uses a discrete time period for a limited number of unemployed and 
 
17 See for an overview on the search and matching models Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) 
18 See for an overview on the literature on the matching function Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)  
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vacancies to allow for precise modelling of the matching process of the PES and the 
municipalities. 
Most search and matching models view the workforce as homogeneous. These models are 
built on the assumption that in the labour market a suitable match is always available, but 
unemployed and firms have to search for the match. Some search and matching models like 
Pissarides (1979) introduce heterogeneity of workers in their incentives to search. I include the 
heterogeneity of workers in a different way. Since in my model the unemployed do not search 
for vacancies, but the employment office or the municipality do so, the heterogeneity of 
workers is not reflected in the search process. As in Coles and Smith (1998) the heterogeneity 
of workers is reflected in the matching process. They discuss the matching process from a 
marketplace model. Coles and Smith (1998) assume that before a meeting takes place, the 
unemployed and firms have searched all current options and if the meeting is not a success, they 
have to wait until new workers and jobs flow in to have a new opportunity of matching. My 
model takes an intermediate position between the standard search and matching model and the 
marketplace model. On the one hand my model differs from the standard search and matching 
model in the respect that it can be the case that there is no suitable match available during the 
current period. On the other hand my model differs from Coles and Smith (1998) in the respect 
that unemployed and firms do not search all current options before a meeting so that it is 
possible that after a failed meeting another meeting from among the current stock of 
unemployed or firms is successful. 
My matching function relates the matching probability to the number of unemployed and 
vacancies. These numbers depend on whether the labour market is considered locally or 
regionally, as in Coles and Smith (1996). However, the matching function used in Coles and 
Smith (1996) is designed to empirically check the returns to scale in job search, while I 
explicitly open the ‘black box’ of the matching function by modelling the working of the 
matching process and the role of heterogeneity of firms and workers. 
 
2.2  Non Cooperative Game Theory 
I make use of non cooperative game theory, as presented for example in Mas-Colell et al. 
(1995). The players in my model are not unemployed or firms, but the PES and the 
municipalities. The outcome of my model is the unemployment rate and this outcome depends 
on the decisions taken by the municipalities and the PES.  
In the following situations I use game theory. Firstly, if the municipalities provide the 
employment services, the outcome of the matching process depends on the choices made by the  
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municipalities and their ability to cooperate. The relationship between the municipalities takes 
the form of a Prisoner’s Dilemma.
19 
Secondly, principal-agent theory helps to understand the relationship between the PES and 
the municipalities. The municipalities want the PES to act in their interest by exerting the 
optimal level of search effort. However, if drawing up perfect contract is impossible it is a 
problem for the municipalities to let the PES act in their interest. The situation can be compared 
to the situation where the government has to decide whether to provide a service in-house or to 
contract out the service, as discussed in Hart et al. (1997). Hart et al. (1997) show that whether a 
service should be provided by a public organisation or by a private party depends on the 
importance of cost innovation and quality innovation. A private organisation has the residual 
control rights and therefore focuses generally too much on cost reduction which might 
deteriorate quality. So privatisation is only optimal if cost reductions can be limited by contracts 
or competition. Keeping the service in-house is optimal if quality innovation is unimportant, if 
government procurement is sensitive to corruption and if non-contractible cost reductions have 
a large negative impact on quality. In my thesis the municipalities care about both the quality 
(regional labour market effect) and the costs (incentive effect) of the employment services. 
However, unlike in Hart et al. (1997) the PES does provide enough quality by facilitating the 
regional labour market which leads to a better matching process. Hart et al.’s (1997) model 
differs from mine in the sense that the PES is a public organisation which does not care for 
profits as a private organisation does. As in Hart et al. (1997) the public employment office 
focuses too less on costs. In general the relationship between the PES and the municipalities is 
not a principal-agent problem in the strict sense, since in my thesis the municipality is not the 
principal who can influence the behaviour of the PES by drawing up a contract, but it is the 
central government which decides on a contract with the PES.  
In Section 6 I apply principal-agent theory more directly. The policy option to privatise the 
CWI and to auction the license to mediate is related both to principal-agent theory and to 
auction theory.
20 The policy option to write a performance contract with the PES is related to 
principal-agent theories as discussed in Hart et al. (1997), Martin and Grubb (2001) and Crémer 
(1995). Following Hart et al. (1997) writing a performance contract with the PES might shift 
the focus of the PES from quality to cost reduction. Based on the evaluation of experiments 
with performance contracts for the PES, Martin and Grubb (2001) argue that mechanisms that 
introduce incentives for the PES increase the effectiveness of the PES. Using the central result 
of Crémer (1995) one can argue that the incentives of the PES to exert effort will be lower if the 
municipality knows whether the results of the employment services were due to efforts of the 
PES or due to factors the PES cannot influence. The finding of Crémer (1995) is helpful in 
deciding which performance indicators should determine the payoffs of the PES. 
 
19 See e.g. Selten (1978) 
20 See for an overview on auction theory Milgrom (2004)  
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Finally, the matching function in my model makes use of tools like games in extensive forms.  
2.3  Empirical literature 
2.3.1  The performance of the PES 
My thesis asks the question whether the activities of the PES should be performed at a local or 
at a regional level. However, a first issue is whether the activities performed by the PES are 
effective at all. In other words, does the PES help to reduce unemployment? This issue has 
received considerable attention in the empirical literature and is part of the literature on the 
effectiveness of active labour market policies.
21  Martin and Grubb (2001) report that among all 
active labour market policies labour market training, subsidised employment in the private 
sector and the employment services provided by the PES can be effective. However, the impact 
of the policies depends on the target group and is in general small.  
The employment services of the PES can be split in low-intensity counselling and high-
intensity monitoring and job search assistance. Counselling takes the form of helping 
unemployed drawing up a resume and application letter and informing them how to search for 
vacancies. Monitoring means that the PES checks whether the unemployed exerts enough effort 
to find a job. The model I develop in this thesis focuses on the job search assistance provided by 
the PES. This service consists of help with the search for suitable vacancies and help with the 
application procedure.  
Counselling does not have an impact on the job search effectiveness of unemployed, as Van 
den Berg and Van der Klaauw (2006) show. On the other hand, high-intensity employment 
services are effective instruments to increase the outflow from unemployment, although in 
general the effect is small.
22 However, if the unemployed make use of the job search assistance 
provided by the PES, this comes at the expense of informal job search. Furthermore, 
Ashenfelter et al. (2005) show that monitoring the search efforts of unemployment is not 
effective and they conclude that job search assistance remains as the only effective instrument 
for the PES to reduce unemployment. The effectiveness of the employment services differs for 
target groups and to be effective job search assistance needs to be complemented with other 
policies. Still, as Koning (2007) shows, the job search assistance provided by the PES is a cheap 
and cost-effective labour market instrument. 
The conclusion that appears from the papers on the performance of the PES is that the 
services offered by the PES, especially intensive job search assistance, have a small but 
significant negative impact on unemployment. Therefore, the value of the PES to society is 
 
21 See for an overview on the effectiveness of active labour market policies Martin and Grubb (2001) 
22 See for example Van Ours (1994), Gorte and Kalb (1994), Gregg and Wadsworth (1996), Dolton and O’Neill (1996) and 
Meyer (1995).  
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positive.  However, the value of the PES as an institution to facilitate the regional labour market 
remains unexplored. 
2.3.2  Regional labour market 
The research question asks whether the employment services should be provided at a local level 
or at a regional level. Therefore, my research is related to regional labour market theory. Coles 
and Smith (1996) argue that if there are constant returns to scale in the number of unemployed 
and firms searching on a local labour market, there might increasing returns to scale on the 
regional labour market, since the unemployed and firms can search in the neighbouring market 
as well. In other words, the number of matches is larger if the firms and unemployed search 
both locally and in the neighbouring labour markets. However, Coles and Smith (1996) do not 
find empirical support for increasing returns to scale. Does this evidence imply that the regional 
labour market has no value? No, because the approach of Coles and Smith (1996) and my 
model differ in the definition of the local labour market. Coles and Smith (1996) define the 
local labour market as a travel-to-work area and look for spill over effects only between the 
travel-to-work areas. It makes sense they do not find significant spill over effects, since by 
definition most workers do not travel to work beyond the borders of their travel-to-work area. In 
my model the travel-to-work area is a regional labour market which consists of local markets. It 
is plausible to expect increasing returns to scale, if unemployed and firms do not only meet 
locally but also within the whole travel-to-work area. 
Another spill over effect between adjoining labour markets is present if the unemployed-
vacancy ratios are different in the labour markets. Burda and Profit (1996) and Burgess and 
Profit (2001) show that differences in the unemployed-vacancy ratio between regional labour 
markets have an effect on the matching probabilities in the regional labour markets and on 
migration between municipalities. Although Burda and Profit (1996) and Burgess and Profit 
(2001) do not explain how the matching probability is determined, the insights of these models 
might be helpful in extending my model to account for differences in unemployment rates 
between municipalities as discussed in Section 6.  
As I have argued, giving the responsibility to provide the employment services to the 
municipalities leads to higher efforts to reduce unemployment. Giving the mediator task to the 
municipalities has other effects as well. Lundin and Skedinger (2006) argue that giving the 
responsibility for active labour market policies to the municipalities leads to efficiency gains 
since the municipalities have first-hand knowledge about the situation on the labour market. 
However, inefficiencies will arise if municipalities use their labour market policies to increase 
or maintain the population, leading to geographical lock-in effects. Although Lundin and 
Skedinger (2006) address effects of decentralisation of the employment services, they do not go 
into the issue of the role of the PES on the regional labour market.  
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2.4  Conclusion 
In this section I have shown how my research is related to existing theoretical and empirical 
literature. Theoretically my thesis builds firstly on search and matching models and has the 
matching function in common with the search and matching models. A notable difference with 
standard search and matching models is that in my model workers and jobs are heterogeneous. 
The second building block is non cooperative game theory, in particular principal-agent theory. 
The empirical literature firstly shows that in general the PES is useful in reducing 
unemployment and secondly that there are spill over effects between labour markets. 
However, as far as I know my thesis is the first which analyzes the PES as an institution that 
facilitates the regional labour market. My model gives an intuitive story for the differences in 
the returns to scale in the matching process between a regional labour market and a local labour 
market. It is complementary to the literature on the matching function in its attempt to model 
the ‘black box’ of the matching process. Next, my paper helps to clarify the mechanisms at 
work when thinking about how to give incentives to those who have the responsibility to 
provide the employment services.   
  15 
3  Basic Model 
In this section I develop a model to evaluate the welfare effects of the setups with and without a 
public employment service (PES). In Section 1 I discussed the two goals which are relevant in 
the discussion about who should provide the employment services. The first goal is creating a 
well-functioning regional labour market and the second goal is to align incentives and 
responsibilities. The setup with a PES reaches the goal a well-functioning regional labour 
market. The setup without a PES reaches the goal of aligned incentives and responsibilities.  
The setup of this section is as follows. First I give the main features and assumptions of the 
model in Section 3.1. In Section 3.2 I discuss the setup where there is no PES, but where the 
municipalities search for vacancies for themselves. Next, in Section 3.3 the PES searches for 
vacancies. In Section 3.4 I compare both setups and answer the question which of the two 
setups yields higher welfare. Section 3.5 concludes. 
3.1  Setup and Assumptions 
Consider a model with two municipalities called M1 and M2. The municipalities form a regional 
labour market. In Section 3.3 there is also a region-wide public employment service. The 
municipalities interact in a single period. Municipalities act non-cooperatively and their own 
payoff is their sole interest. 
3.1.1  Unemployed and vacancies 
Both municipalities have one unemployed labelled ui for Mi, i=1,2.  
In Section 3.2 the municipalities independently find a vacancy with probability γ, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. 
So the number of vacancies vi can be 0 or 1. There are four possible situations: {v1, v2} Î{ {1, 
1}, {1, 0}, {0, 1}, {0, 0} }. The probabilities these events occur are respectively γ
2, γ(1-γ), γ(1-
γ) and (1-γ)
2. The probability that a vacancy is found is called the contact rate. The contact rate 
is exogenous. Municipalities search for vacancies only within their own jurisdiction. Therefore, 
the probability a municipality finds a vacancy does not depend on the searching of the other 
municipality. 
In Section 3.3 I introduce a PES that searches for the vacancies. The PES can find at most 
two vacancies. Its contact rate is η, 0 ≤ η ≤ 1. So the probabilities the PES finds respectively 
two, one and zero vacancies are η
2, 2η(1-η) and (1-η)
2. the PES searches for one vacancy in the 
jurisdiction of the first municipality and for the second vacancy in the jurisdiction of the second 
municipality. 
Assumption 3.1 0 ≤ η ≤ γ. 
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Assumption 3.1 states that the PES is at most as effective as the municipality in searching for 
vacancies. It reflects the proposition that the municipalities have a strong financial incentive to 
search for incentives, which the PES lacks. I assume that this makes the PES less effective in 
searching. For example, the civil servants of the municipalities call firms to ask whether the 
firm has a vacancy, while the PES officer waits until a firm notifies the PES that the firm has a 
vacancy. 
3.1.2  Meeting and matching 
The matching process reflects the value of a regional labour market. I have designed the 
matching process in a way that gives the PES an advantage in matching over the municipalities. 
Since the matching process is different for the setups with and without a PES, a detailed 
description of the matching process is postponed to Section 3.2 and Section 3.3.  
Any meeting between an unemployed and a firm which has a vacancy will result in a match 
with probability α, 0< α<1. This probability is called the offer-acceptance probability. The 
offer-acceptance probability is smaller than one because workers and jobs are heterogeneous. 
Not every worker will have the characteristics required for the job. So not everyone is hired 
after a job interview. Instead of explicitly modelling the characteristics of workers and the 
requirements of the jobs, I assume there is a fixed offer-acceptance probability. The term 
meeting refers to an unemployed going to a job interview. Matching is the term for a successful 
meeting: the unemployed is hired. The matching process is the process of meeting and 
matching. 
3.1.3  Payoffs 
If an unemployed is not matched to a vacancy at the end of the period, the municipality has to 
pay the unemployed a social assistance benefit, which is normalised at one. If the municipality 
has no unemployed left, it does not have to pay anything.  
The value of a vacancy which is left at the end of the period is δ, 0 < δ < 1. The value of δ is 
larger than zero because the municipality can keep the vacancy for a next period. In that period 
the municipality might need it for its unemployed. It would then save a benefit. δ is smaller than 
one, since it is not certain it can use the vacancy and save a benefit in the next period. It is not 
certain because in the next period the municipality may find another vacancy. If a municipality 
has no vacancy left, the value is zero. In the setup without a PES, this value is part of the payoff 
of the municipality. In the setup with a PES, the above reasoning holds as well, but now the 
PES controls the vacancies. The value is part of general welfare; it does not directly contribute 
to the payoffs of the municipalities, since they do not control the vacancies. The PES has no 
profit motive so it does not value the unused vacancy.  
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Municipalities do not value a match apart from the saving on benefits nor do they value a match 
between their own unemployed and a vacancy from their own jurisdiction more than a match 
between their own unemployed and a vacancy from the other municipality. 
The payoff is the sum of the cost of the unemployed and the value of the vacancy. For 
example, if a municipality has both a vacancy and an unemployed left its payoff is (δ-1). If it 
has only an unemployed left, its payoff is -1. If it has neither a vacancy nor an unemployed left 
its payoff is 0. Note that δ-1 < 0: municipalities prefer a success of a meeting above a failure. 
Welfare is the sum of the payoffs of both municipalities and, in the setup without a PES, the 
value of the unused vacancies. Expected payoff is the payoff of the outcome multiplied by the 
probability the outcome occurs, given the strategies of the municipalities.  
3.1.4  Informational assumptions 
The municipalities and the PES ex ante know 1) the contact rate, 2) the matching probability 
and 3) the corresponding payoffs. The municipalities and the PES have full information about 
the working of the matching process. The municipalities have private information about the 
number of vacancies they have found, about their choices made and about the outcome of the 
matching process.  
3.1.5  Timing 
The exact timing of the game depends on the presence of a PES. Therefore, details of the timing 
will be given in Section 3.2 and Section 3.3. The general timing is as follows. 
t = 0: Searching process: Nature determines the number of vacancies and the participants 
observe the number of their vacancies. 
t = 1: Matching process takes place. 
t = 2: Participants receive their payoff. 
Table 3.1  Probabilities and symbols 
Probability  Meaning  Symbol 
     
Contact rate (Municipality)  The probability the municipality finds a vacancy  γ 
Contact rate (PES)  The probability the PES finds a vacancy  η 
Offer-acceptance probability  The probability meeting between an unemployed and a firm results in match  α 
Matching probability  The probability the matching process results in a match  µ 
Outflow rate  The probability an unemployed finds a job   χ 
Value of left vacancy  The value of an unused vacancy in the next period  δ 
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3.2  Sharing versus Keeping 
In this section I model the setup without a PES. The central questions are 1) whether 
municipalities will cooperate by sharing vacancies they themselves cannot use and 2) what level 
of welfare cooperation and non-cooperation yield. In Section 3.2.1 I describe the game, in 
Section 3.2.2 I show that cooperation is not an equilibrium and I conclude in Section 3.2.3. 
3.2.1  The game 
Before the game starts, when t = 0, Nature draws the values of vi in the way described in 
Section 3.1. The municipalities observe the number of vacancies they have found themselves, vi 
= 0 or 1, i = 1, 2. 
During t = 1, the matching process takes place. When there is no PES, the process consists 
of three stages. 
In Stage 1 the municipalities try to match the vacancy with their own unemployed, provided 
they have found a vacancy. The meeting is a success with probability α. For the successful 
municipality the game ends and the municipality receives its payoff. If the meeting is a failure, 
the municipality participates in Stage 2. If a municipality has not found a vacancy (vi = 0), it 
goes directly to Stage 3. 
In Stage 2 the municipality has two choices: 1) to share its unused vacancy with the other 
municipality which can use the vacancy for its unemployed, or 2) to keep the vacancy for the 
next period. If both municipalities have a vacancy left, they choose simultaneously. 
Municipalities base their choice whether to share or keep their vacancy on the expected payoffs 
of both choices and they will choose the strategy which yields the highest expected payoff. The 
game ends at the end of Stage 2, if none of the municipalities has decided to share its vacancy. 
In Stage 3 a municipality can use the shared vacancy of the other municipality to try to 
match it to its own unemployed. The vacancy and unemployed will meet and this will result in a 
match with probability α. If the meeting is a failure, the vacancy “returns” to the municipality 
which has shared it and this municipality receives the value δ. 
At t = 2, the game ends and the municipalities receive their payoff, as described in Section 
3.1.3. 
Figure 8.1 in the appendix shows the game in extensive form. 
3.2.2  Strategies, equilibrium and welfare 
Municipalities base their decision whether to share or not on the expected payoffs. A dominant 




23 See Rasmusen (2001)  
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a m = PES No
Proposition 3.1 In equilibrium the municipalities do not cooperate. 
Proof: If a municipality decides to keep its vacancy, it receives the value of a kept vacancy δ 
for sure. If a municipality shares its vacancy, there is a chance the other municipality will use it. 
In that case the sharing municipality receives no value from its vacancy. There is also 
probability the meeting is not successful or the other municipality does not need the shared 
vacancy. Then the sharing municipality still receives value δ. But the expected payoff after 
sharing is smaller than δ. Therefore, the dominant strategy is to keep the vacancy. 
The choice of the second municipality does not influence the choice of the first 
municipality. The first municipality would like the second municipality to share, since then the 
first municipality has a chance of matching its unemployed. But the choice of the second 
municipality does not change the ranking of the expected payoffs of the strategies of the first 
municipality. 
The municipalities cannot credibly commit themselves to share. To show this, suppose the 
municipalities agree in advance that they will share if they have a vacancy to share. Since the 
municipalities choose simultaneously, they cannot punish a cheating municipality. And since 
the expected payoffs of keeping are always higher than the payoffs of sharing, it is not in the 
interest of the municipality to stick to its promise to share. 
So for both municipalities not cooperation is the best strategy and in equilibrium the 
municipalities will not cooperate. 
 
Since the matching process consists of only one meeting between unemployed and firm, the 
matching probability is equal to the offer-acceptance probability: 
 
 
Total expected equilibrium welfare, denoted by π
No PES, is: 
( )( ) ( ) [ ] g d a g p - - - - = 1 1 1 2 PES No   (3.1)  
This expression has an intuitive interpretation. The left hand side between the square brackets is 
the expected payoff if a municipality has a vacancy and an unemployed left at the end of the 
game. The probability a municipality finds a vacancy is the contact rate γ. The vacancy and 
unemployed are left with a probability of (1-α) and if this is the case the payoff is (δ-1). If the 
municipality has no vacancy and unemployed left the payoff is 0, so this has not to be included. 
At the right hand side, the expected payoff is -(1-γ). This is the probability of having  found no 
vacancy, (1-γ), times the level of the social assistance benefit (-1). The sum is multiplied by 
two, since there are two municipalities.  
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Proposition 3.2 Equilibrium welfare is suboptimal. 
Proof: Expected welfare if both municipalities share is: 
  (3.2) 
 
 








Proposition 3.3 Expected welfare if one of the municipalities cooperates by sharing its 
vacancies and the other municipality keeps its vacancies is higher than if both agents do not 












Going from {Keep, Keep} to {Share, Share} is a Pareto improvement, but, as I said before, the 
municipalities will not share. Going from {Keep, Keep} to {Keep, Share} or {Share, Keep} is 
no Pareto improvement: the “naive” municipality who shares its vacancy lowers his expected 
payoff if he chooses to cooperate. Therefore, this welfare level is not attainable either.
 
3.2.3  Conclusion 
In the setup without a PES the municipalities have to decide whether they want to share their 
unused vacancies. I have shown that the municipalities will never share their vacancies. The  
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regional labour market does not function and the resulting welfare is suboptimal. In fact, the 
situation where both municipalities have the option to share their vacancies, is an example of a 
prisoner’s dilemma. In Section 3.4 I will compare the welfare of the non-cooperative 
equilibrium with the welfare when there is a PES. In Section 4.1 I examine the effect on the 
equilibrium if the game is played more than once. 
3.3  Pooling 
This section models the current situation in the Netherlands, where the public employment 
service CWI provides the employment services and facilitates the regional labour market. The 
PES is a regional institution which collects the vacancies and arranges meetings between 
unemployed and vacancies. Since the PES pools the unemployed and vacancies, it can arrange 
more meetings between unemployed and vacancies than the individual municipalities. If there 
are more meetings  the matching probability will be higher. This explains the value of the 
regional labour market in my model. 
The section is organised as follows. In Section 3.3.1 I introduce the common pool and in 
Section 3.3.2 I calculate welfare. 
3.3.1  The common pool 
As described in Section 3.1, I assume that in the setup with a PES, the municipalities do not 
search for vacancies themselves, but the PES collects the vacancies. Again the maximum 
number of vacancies which can be collected is two. The unemployed and vacancies are pooled 
and in the next stage the PES randomly assigns the unemployed to the firms with vacancies for 
meetings. 
3.3.1.1  Two vacancies 
First I discuss the case where the PES has found two vacancies. This happens with 
 probability 
η
2. The unemployed can go either both to the same firm for a meeting or both to a different 
firm. I assume that the probability of to which firm the unemployed is sent is a half, since the 
PES is indifferent between the firms.  
The probability the meeting is a success is α, but only one unemployed can be matched to a 
vacancy. For example, if both unemployed meet v1, the probability ui is matched to v1 is α(1-α). 
The probability neither of them is matched to v1 is (1-α)
2.  
If the meeting between ui and the first firm is not successful, ui can go for a job interview to 
the other firm, provided uj has not been matched to that vacancy. Also in the second meeting the 
probability the meeting is a success with probability α. 
The outcome tree in extensive form is shown in 
  22 
Figure 8.2 in the appendix. I sum the matching probabilities in all possible situations to find 
µ
PES for the case the PES has found two vacancies. If the PES has found two vacancies the 
matching probability is: 







1 a a m - - - - = =
PES
v   (3.3) 
Proposition 3.4 If the PES finds two vacancies,  PES No PES
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So this shows the advantage of the PES. If two vacancies are found, the unemployed can go to 
at most two firms for a meeting. If the municipalities provide the employment services they can 
arrange only one meeting between their own unemployed and vacancy only.  
3.3.1.2  One or none vacancies 
With probability 2η(1-η), the PES finds only one vacancy. Then both unemployed meet this 
vacancy. The probability that ui is not matched to this vacancy is (1-α). This value is the same 
as in the setup without a PES. The probability that the vacancy is not filled is (1-α)
2, which is 
smaller than in the setup without a PES. 
With probability (1-η)
2 there are no vacancies found and there is nothing to meet and match. 
3.3.2  Welfare 
After the matching process, the municipalities pay social assistance benefits to unemployed 
who have not found a job. Expected welfare is the sum of the expected payoffs of both 
municipalities and of the value of unused vacancies. Total expected welfare, π
PES is the sum of  
  23 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( )2 2 3 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 h a a d h h a a d h p - - - - - - + - + - - = PES
( )( ) ( ) [ ] g d a g p - - - - = 1 1 1 2 PES No
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( )2 2 3 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 h a a d h h a a d h p - - - - - - + - + - - = PES
expected welfare if there are two vacancies found, if there is one vacancy found and if there are 
none found: 
  (3.4) 
 
3.4  Keeping versus Pooling 
In Section 3.2 I have shown that without a PES the goal of a regional labour market is not met. 
In Section 3.3 I have demonstrated the functioning of the common pool. The common pool 
gives the PES an advantage over the municipalities, but the PES is less effective in searching 
for vacancies. In this section I show when welfare is higher for the setup with a PES and when 
welfare is higher in the setup without a PES. The performance of the PES compared to the 
performance of the municipalities depends on the parameters, especially the contact rate and the 
offer-acceptance probability. In Section 3.4.1 I first make a general comparison between the 
welfare levels of the two setups and next I construct a formula to be able to examine the effects 
of the parameters on the choice between the setups. In Section 3.4.2 I interpret the effect of the 
parameters on the choice for a setup. 
3.4.1  Welfare PES and No PES 
In Section 3.2.2 and Section 3.3.2 I found the welfare levels for the setup where there is no PES 
and where there is a PES. I repeat the expressions here. 
(3.1) 
   
 
  (3.4) 
By comparing the outcomes of the formulas I can answer the research question whether the 
employment service should be provided by the municipalities or by the PES. 
A different representation of the formulas gives a first impression. 
Table 3.2  Welfare - No PES 
Situation    v2 = 1  v2 = 0 
       
  Prob.  γ  1-γ 
v1 = 1  γ  (δ-1)(1-α) + (δ-1)(1-α)  (δ-1)(1-α) + (-1) 
v1 = 0  1-γ  -1 + (δ-1)(1-α)  (-1) + (-1) 
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Table 3.3  Welfare - PES 
Situation    v2 = 1  v2 = 0 
       
  Prob.  η  1-η 
v1 = 1  η  (δ-1)[½(1-α)+½(1-α)
3] + (δ-1)[½(1-α)+½(1-α)
3]  δ(1-α)
2 -(1-α) - (1-α)  
v1 = 0  1-η  -(1-α) + δ(1-α)
2 - (1-α)  (-1) + (-1) 
 
Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 show the four situations which can occur in the two setups. The main 
point is that in every situation {v1, v2} the welfare of the PES is at least as high as the welfare of 
the setup where there is no PES. Let’s show this. 
If {v1, v2} ={1, 1}, welfare of the PES is higher than in the setup without a PES, since [½(1-
α)+½(1-α)
3] < (1-α) and since (δ-1)<0. 
If {v1, v2} ={1, 0}or {0, 1}, δ(1-α)
2 -(1-α) - (1-α)  = δ - 2αδ + α
2δ - 2 + 2α > δ - αδ  - 2 + α = 
(δ-1)(1-α) + (-1). 
And if {v1, v2} ={0, 0}, the welfare is the same for both setups. 
Should we conclude then that it is better to have a PES? No. The reason is that if the PES 
has a lower contact rate than the municipalities (η ≤  γ), the probability is larger to end up in the 
situation with the lowest welfare {v1, v2} = {0, 0} where welfare is -2. 
So from these tables the trade off is clearly visible: Either increased welfare from a higher 
matching probability if we opt for a PES or increased welfare from a higher contract rate if we 
choose to have no PES. Which of the two effects outweighs the other depends on the 
parameters of the model: α, γ, η & δ. I combine the profit functions in one expression to 
evaluate the effect of the parameters on the choice of the setup. 
Proposition 3.5 Welfare levels for the setup with and without a PES are the same if: 
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Equation (3.5) shows what value of γ yields the same welfare for the setup with and without 
a PES, for given values of α, δ and η. This value is called γ*. 
Proposition 3.6  π
PES > π
No PES if and only if  * g g < . 
Proof: Suppose initially γ = γ*. This implies π
PES = π
No PES. Then γ decreases. The outflow rate 
of the municipalities decreases and the probability that the municipalities have to pay a benefit 





3.4.2  Effect parameters on choice setup 
Figure 3.1 shows γ* as a function of α. The figure is based on an example where η is 0.6 and δ 
is 0.2. Above the line, welfare is higher without a PES. The PES has a higher matching 
probability, but this does not outweigh its disadvantage of the lower contact rate. Below the line 
welfare is higher with a PES. In this area the PES has a higher matching probability which 
outweighs its disadvantage of a lower contact rate. The line is an indifference curve where the 
advantages and disadvantage of the two setups balance and where the welfare levels are the 
same. The indifference curve is first upward sloping and then downward sloping for this 
example. As I will show later, this does not have to be the case for all parameter values.  
The basic inside is that a PES is only preferable above the setup without a PES if the 
inefficacy in searching is relatively small, i.e. η is close to γ. 
I discuss the effect of the parameters on γ* in turn.  
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3.4.2.1  The effect of α on γ* 
To have a clear picture of the effect of the offer-acceptance probability α on the setup choice, 
suppose the contact rates of the PES and the municipalities are the same and equal to one. 
In this case the only difference between the setup with and without a PES is the working of 
the matching process: the common pool yields a higher matching probability.  
The benefits of the common pool are the largest for values of α not close to one or zero. This 
is the case because of the following. At values of α close to one, the benefits from the PES are 
relatively small since the municipalities have a high matching probability anyway. At low 
values of α, the advantage of the PES is also relatively small, since the PES is not very helpful 
in matching: whether there is a PES or not, the matching probability is very low. So for 
intermediate values of α the effect of the common pool is largest and, to still have the same 
welfare levels in both setups, the contact rate of the municipalities should be substantially larger 
than the contact rate of the PES. 







The denominator is always strictly positive. Define the numerator as N.   
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then           first increases and then decreases. 
  







3.4.2.2  The effect of η on γ* 
Figure 3.2 shows indifference curves for various values of η with δ = 0.2. An increase in the 
contact rate of the PES increases the attractiveness of a setup with a PES. There is a larger 
probability the PES finds a vacancy and a higher outflow rate. Expected welfare increases 
compared to the welfare of the setup without a PES. Therefore, the indifference curve shifts up: 
to have still the same welfare in both setups, the municipalities should have a higher contact 
rate. 
The horizontal indifference curve for η = 0.8 shows that for some values of α and high 
levels of η, there is no value of γ for which the welfare without a PES is higher than the welfare 
with a PES. In these cases, the advantage of the PES can in no way be offset by the advantage 
of the setup without a PES, since for these parameter values, the PES has a high contact rate 
itself.  
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3.4.2.3  The effect of δ on γ* 
Figure 3.3 shows indifference curves for various values of δ with η = 0.6. If δ increases, the 
area where it is optimal to have a PES becomes smaller. Why is this the case?  
If δ increases, the value of an unused vacancy increases: if municipalities have a vacancy, 
they are less worried whether the matching process is successful, since the vacancy is more 
valuable. For intermediate values of α, the difference in matching probability between the two 
setups is the highest. Stated differently, in the setup with a PES, in this region the probability  
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one does not use the vacancy is smallest. And therefore, also the probability is smaller that one 
can benefit from the increased value from an unused vacancy. So for intermediate values of α, 
an increase in the value of an unused vacancy leads to a larger increase in welfare for the setup 
without a PES than for the setup with a PES. Even at a lower contact rate we prefer a setup 
without a PES.  
If α is close to zero or one, the value of δ hardly influences the indifference curve. This is 
the case because the matching probabilities for the setup with and without a PES are almost the 
same. 
Corollary 3.3 If δ  increases, γ* decreases. 
Proof: 
 
   
 
The denominator is strictly positive. So if the numerator is strictly negative, γ* decreases when 
δ increases. Denote the numerator by N. Then: 
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γ* δ = 0.2
δ = 0.8
 
3.5  Conclusion 
The main findings from my model are the following. First, the municipalities will never share 
their vacancies. Second, the answer to the question whether welfare is higher in the setup with 
or without a PES depends on the values of the parameters. The lower the contact rate of the 
PES, the lower welfare in the setup with a PES. The benefits from the regional labour market 
are the largest for intermediate values of the offer-acceptance probability. A higher value of an 
unused vacancy implies that we more often prefer the setup without a PES, since the 
municipalities are less eager to have their vacancies matched.  
The next step I take is to extend the model to add some more realism. This is the topic of the 
next section.   
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4  Model Extensions 
In this section I add some elements to the model developed in Section 0. The extensions should 
make the analysis more realistic. The model of Section 0 is a one-period model. One of the 
central conclusions is that the municipalities will not cooperate by sharing their unused 
vacancies. In Section 4.1 I investigate whether the municipalities will share their unused 
vacancies if the game is played more than once and I discuss the effect of multiple interactions 
on the choice between the two institutional designs - a PES or no PES. Another simplification is 
that the municipalities have only one unemployed and at most one vacancy. The value of the 
regional labour market depends on this concept. In Section 4.2 I  show what the effect of a 
larger labour market is on the choice of the setup. Thus far I have ignored the costs of 
searching. In Section 4.3 I discuss the effect of fixed search costs on the choice of the setup. 
Section 4.4 concludes. 
4.1  Cooperation 
While my model is a static model which lasts for only one period, in reality the employment 
services are provided continuously and there is an ongoing in- and outflow of unemployed. The 
question arises what will happen to welfare if the game is played more than once. The game I 
have found in Section 3.2.2 is equivalent to a Prisoner’s Dilemma. Selten (1978) has shown 
that, if the discount factor is sufficiently large in an infinitely repeated game, cooperation is a 
perfect equilibrium outcome. Such equilibrium can be attained for example by a tit-for-tat 
strategy. However, eternal cooperation is not the only equilibrium. In fact, any equilibrium 
between full cooperation and no cooperation is an equilibrium. 
Still, suppose that the municipalities repeat the game and do not foresee an end to their 
interactions and have chosen to cooperate, for example because the other municipality has a 
good reputation.
24 What will happen to the critical value of γ, γ*?  
Proposition 4.1 If municipalities cooperate, γ* decreases compared to the situation where the 
municipalities do not cooperate. 
Proof: Suppose that initially the values of η, γ, α and δ are such that π
PES = π
No PES. According 
to Proposition 3.5, it holds that γ = γ*. Then the municipalities start to cooperate. For the given 
γ, π




PES , according to Proposition 3.2. Now we prefer the setup without a 
PES. Following Proposition 3.6, we only prefer the setup without a PES if γ > γ*. So γ* has 
decreased. 
So the disadvantage of the municipalities is smaller because by sharing unused vacancies the 
municipalities create a regional labour market. Still, the contact rate of the municipalities should 
 
24 Alternatively, the municipalities might sell each other unused vacancies. The conclusion of this section remains the same.  
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be higher than the contact rate of the PES to have the same welfare, since the common pool 
yields a better regional labour market than cooperation between municipalities: The 
municipalities exchange vacancies only if the vacancies are left over after their own matching 
process, while the PES allocates the vacancies optimally over the unemployed. 
In short, cooperation by sharing unused vacancies can in principle lead to a regional labour 
market. The regional labour market yields more matches than if the municipalities do not 
cooperate, but still is inferior to the common pool which the PES creates. Figure 4.1 shows the 
effect of reputation on the critical value of γ.  




















4.2  Variation in Labour Market Size 
In Section 0 I assumed that the municipalities both have one unemployed and at most one 
vacancy. In reality the municipalities have numerous unemployed and vacancies. In this section 
I investigate the effect of a larger labour market on the choice of the setup.  
If the municipalities have multiple unemployed they can send their unemployed to more 
firms. Similarly, if the firms have many vacancies, the firms can have more meetings with 
unemployed. Therefore, to some extent a municipality forms a common pool on its own. Still, 
the PES can always send the unemployed to more firms than the municipalities. However, the 
advantage of the PES over the municipalities diminishes for growing numbers of unemployed 
and vacancies. Obviously, for some size of the municipality the additional effect of the PES is 
negligible and other factors, like the (un-)willingness of workers to travel far to their work, 
dominate the common pool effect.  
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So if the number of unemployed is large, the matching probabilities of the PES and the 
municipalities are almost the same. The value of the PES decreases if the labour market is 
larger. The only difference between the PES and the municipalities as mediator is the contact 
rate. So if the municipalities have many unemployed and vacancies, the employment services 
could better be provided by the municipalities, even if the municipalities have only slightly 
higher contact rates than the PES. Figure 4.2 shows the effect of the size of the labour market 
on γ*.  
This effect is one of the reasons why in the Netherlands some CWIs have only one 
municipality in their region. These municipalities are usually large and therefore constitute a 
common pool in themselves. The largest cities in the Netherlands have even more than one 
CWI. This model predicts that in cases where a municipality is large enough to form a common 
pool on its own, it is optimal to give the responsibility of mediation to the municipalities.
25 





















Another issue in this context is if the two municipalities are of unequal size. Suppose one 
municipality has more unemployed and vacancies than the other. Because of diminishing 
marginal returns to scale the increase in the matching probability for the large municipality is 
smaller than for the small municipality. Therefore, the large municipality is less interested in the 
common pool than the small municipality. For the large municipality the critical value of γ is 
 
25 In some municipalities the responsibility of mediation are - more or less - shared with the municipalities. For example in 
Amsterdam, the PES shares the responsibility of job mediation with the municipalities by close cooperation in one building. 
Unemployed have contact with only consultant who decides on behalf of both the PES and the municipalities. (See Trouw, 
15 August 2007)  
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smaller than for the small municipality. The effect on welfare is ambiguous, since the situation 
with labour markets of equal size is not comparable to the situation where the labour markets 
are of unequal size. 
4.3  Search Costs  
Until now, I have assumed that searching for vacancies is costless. In this section I extend the 
model by introducing fixed search costs. Fixed search costs could consist of a department which 
searches for vacancies. I only consider the fixed search costs. Those costs do not depend on the 
intensity of search after the search department is put in place. Still, ex ante the costs of 
searching for two vacancies are higher than the costs for searching for only one vacancy. 
Therefore the costs for the PES, which searches for two vacancies, are higher than for the 
individual municipalities. However, it is reasonable to expect economies of scale: the cost of 
one searching department searching for two vacancies is smaller than the costs of two 
departments searching both for one vacancy. The costs of the searching department for Mi, i 
=1,2 [the PES] is denoted by Ci [C]. So Ci < C < 2Ci. Parameters with subscript c denote 
parameters based on the model with search costs included. 






   
 
   
 
   




Proposition 4.2 If there are economies of scale, γ*c > γ* 
Proof: 
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So the indifference curve shifts upward, as Figure 4.3 shows. The introduction of fixed search 
costs implies that there are more cases where welfare of the PES is higher than the welfare 
without the PES. The change in the indifference curve from the setup without a PES to the setup 
with a PES is smaller for larger values of α and δ, since then the denominator increases. 
The conclusion of this section is that if there are economies of scale welfare of the PES 
increases compared to the setup without a PES. Search costs may rise if the responsibility for 
the employment services is transferred from the PES to the municipalities. 




















4.4  Conclusion 
In this section I have considered three extensions. The first extension showed that if the 
municipalities interact more than once, cooperation between the municipalities will make the  
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setup without a PES becomes more attractive. In the second extension I argued that the 
advantage of the PES is smaller if the municipalities have more unemployed and vacancies, 
since the municipalities form a regional labour market on their own. The last extension showed 
that in the presence of economies of scale, the inclusion of search costs in the model will lead to 
higher welfare for the setup with a PES relative to the setup without a PES, since the PES 
avoids duplication of search costs.  
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5  Calibration 
In this section I calibrate my model of Section 0. In that section I found an expression, Equation 
(3.5), which compares the welfare levels of the setup with and without a PES. In this section I 
estimate the variables of this expression to have an impression of the size of the regional labour 
market effect. By using various data sources and by implementing some of the extensions of 
Section 4 I can check for the sensitivity of the predictions to various changes in the model and 
the data. 
Ideally, I would like to calculate the value of the contact rate of the municipalities for which  
the welfare levels in both setups are the same, γ*, and compare it to an estimate of the actual 
contact rate of the municipalities, γ. If γ is larger than γ*, the model predicts that the setup 
where the municipalities search for vacancies yields higher welfare than the setup where there is 
a PES. If γ is smaller than γ* the reverse holds. At present the municipalities do not structurally 
search for vacancies, so γ is an unknown, hypothetical value. What I can do is calculate γ* and 
compare it to the contact rate of the PES, η. This gives an estimate of the magnitude of the 
regional labour market advantage of the PES and tells us how much more effective in searching 
for vacancies the municipalities should be to offset the regional labour market advantage of the 
PES. 
The outline of this section is as follows. In Section 5.1 I introduce the data sources. In 
Section 5.2 I estimate the variables α, δ and η and determine the value of γ*. In Section 5.3 I 
perform robustness checks and implement some of the extensions of Section 4. Section 5.4 
concludes. 
5.1  Data 
Lindeboom and Van Ours (1997) give an estimate of the offer-acceptance probability for 
unemployed who use the Dutch employment office. They define the offer-acceptance 
probability as “the probability that a contact turns into a match.”
26 This offer-acceptance 
probability is equivalent to the offer-acceptance probability α used in the model of Section 0, 
where I defined α as the probability that a meeting between an unemployed and a firm that has a 
vacancy will result in a match. Therefore, I use the offer-acceptance probability of Lindeboom 
and Van Ours (1997) as an estimate for α. 
The Dutch Statistics Office CBS provides information on vacancies in the Netherlands on its 
online database.
27 I use quarterly information about the number of vacancies over the period 
1997 to 2006 to determine the outflow rate. More recent data are based on a different estimation 
method and are therefore excluded. 
 
26 Lindeboom and Van Ours (1997, p. 92) 
27 See statline.cbs.nl  
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CWI (2006) shows statistics about the duration of vacancies. Based on these statistics and on 
the information on the CWI website I calculate the length of a period in my model. The 
statistics are based on the situation in 2006.  
5.2  Calibration 
In this section I calibrate Equation (3.5). I repeat this equation below. 
 
                    (3.5) 
 
The three unknown variables are η, α and δ. The variables will be estimated in Sections  5.2.2 to 
5.2.5. I estimate the variables first on a weekly basis and then on the basis of one period. First I 
establish the length of period in Section 5.2.1. 
5.2.1  Length of a period 
In Section 0 I assumed that a vacancy which is not used during the current period can be kept 
until the next period. Then it can be used in the matching process once again. If the meeting 
does not result in a match in the second period, the employer withdraws the vacancy after the 
second period. So a vacancy can remain unfilled for at most two periods. According to the 
information on the website of the CWI about 6% of all vacancies were not filled after three 
months over the period 2003-2004. So an approximation of the length of a period is half a 
quarter of a year or 6.5 weeks. 
In the following, variables based on a period of a week are denoted by subscript w, while 
variables based on a period of 6.5 weeks do not have a subscript. 
5.2.2  Offer-acceptance probability (α) and matching probability (µ) per week 
The offer-acceptance probability α is drawn from Lindeboom and Van Ours (1997, p.97). The 
offer-acceptance probability for an unemployed is 29.8% per week if he or she makes use of the 
PES. The weekly offer-acceptance probability is: 
αw = 0.2982 
So almost 30% of all meetings between an unemployed and a firm results in a match. 
According to the model of Section 0 without a PES the unemployed has at most one 
meeting. Given that there will be a meeting between an unemployed and a firm, the matching 
probability µw is for both unemployed and firm equal the offer-acceptance probability, about 
30%.   
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If there is a PES, more than one meeting is possible. The matching probability in the setup with 
a PES is µ = 1 - ½(1-α) - ½(1-α)
3. This probability is based on the case where the PES has 
found two vacancies, which is not necessarily the case in my model. Still I can use this 
probability, since in practice the PES will always find more than one vacancy and therefore the 
unemployed can go to more than one meeting. The matching probability should be seen as a 
construct to model the advantage of the common pool.  
The matching probability per week is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 47627 . 0 2982 . 0 1
2
1









1 3 3 = - - - - = - - - - = w w w a a m    
So if there is a PES, the probability that a vacancy is filled or an unemployed finds a job, given 
that a vacancy is found, is about 47.6% per week. 
5.2.3  Outflow rate (χ) and contact rate PES (η) 
The outflow rate is defined as the product of the contact rate and the matching probability: 
h m c × º    
I estimate η by using an estimate of χ and the value of µw from Section 5.2.2. The reason I do 
not directly estimate η is that information on the outflow rate is readily available, while the 
contact rate would have to be constructed by relating the number of vacancies found to the 
number of unemployed. Although both numbers are available the data it is difficult to determine 
the relevant number of unemployed. Questions like: “Do long-term unemployed also make use 
of the vacancies of the PES?” and “What proportion of the long-term unemployed makes use of 
the vacancies of the services of the PES?” are difficult to answer. Moreover, whereas 
information about the outflow rate is available for multiple periods, information about the 
contact rate is available for only one period.  
The outflow rate is calculated by dividing the number of filled vacancies by the number of 
stock and new vacancies: 
 vacancies new   and stock 
 vacancies filled
= c    
The data on filled vacancies include also withdrawn vacancies. According to CWI (2006), 12% 
of all vacancies are withdrawn. So the number of filled vacancies is 88% of the number in the 
database of the CBS. I calculate χ for every quarter from the first quarter of 1997 until the end 
of 2006. I average the outflow rate to control for business cycle fluctuations. The outflow rate is 
0.5102: about 51% of the unemployed finds a job within a quarter and about 51% of the  
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527 . 0 = h
vacancies are filled within a quarter. The outflow rate χ is 35.7% per period and the weekly 
outflow rate χw is 5.5%.
28 
As a check I exclude the years 1997 and 1998. The years 1999 to 2006 form more or less 
one complete business cycle. Then the outflow rate falls to 0.5033, so leaving the years 1997 
and 1998 does not affect the results much. 
Since the matching probability is based on a time period of a week and cannot be 
extrapolated to a period of 6.5 weeks without any additional assumptions about the number of 









h    
So the PES finds a vacancy during a period of a week with 11.5% chance and during a period of 
6.5 weeks the contact rate of the PES is: 
 
5.2.4  Offer-acceptance probability (α) and matching probability (µ) per period 
Using the outflow rate and contact rate per period, I calculate the matching probability based on 








   
4879 . 0 = ⇒a    
So almost half of all meetings between an unemployed and a firm results in match. At first 
sight, it might seem strange that the offer-acceptance probability per period of 6.5 weeks is 
larger than the weekly offer-acceptance probability. Over a longer period, more meetings 
between firms and unemployed are possible. So one would expect that the probability a meeting 
is successful is lower. However, my model is not designed to accommodate for multiple 
meetings. The matching probability per 6.5 weeks must be larger than the weekly matching 
probability. Therefore, the offer-acceptance probability per 6.5 weeks has to be larger than the 
weekly offer-acceptance probability. An intuitive explanation is that, if there multiple meetings, 
the probability that an unemployed fits a job is larger and therefore the offer-acceptance 
probability is larger as well.  
 
28 The probabilities are calculated with survival analysis. The probability a vacancy is found or the probability that there is a 
match in the 1/ t portion of the original length of the period is: ln (1-p) / -t, where p is the probability over the whole period.  
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5.2.5  Value of a left vacancy (δ) 
δ is defined as the value of an unused vacancy and depends on the probability the unused 
vacancy is of use in the next period. This value cannot be observed in any dataset. Therefore, I 
have to solve δ endogenously. I do this by calculating the probability the vacancy is of use in 
the next period. In Section 8.2 of the Appendix I show this calculation. The estimate for the 
value of δ is: 
( ) ( )a h a a h d - + - = 1 1    
Using α = 0.488 and η = 0.527, δ = 0.3624. Intuitively this value implies that there is about 36% 
chance the unused vacancy can be used to save a social assistance benefit in the next period. 
5.2.6  Critical value of contact rate Municipalities (γ*) 
Using α = 0.488, η = 0.527 and δ = 0.362, I can calculate γ*: 
 
  (3.5) 
 
According to my model, when the contact rate of the PES is 52.7%, the municipalities should 
have a contact rate of at least 72.4% to offset the advantage of the PES. My model predicts that 
the municipalities should be about 37% more effective in searching for vacancies than the PES 
to yield the same welfare in both setups. 
5.3  Sensitivity Analysis of γ* 
The outcome of the calibration in Section 5.2 may depend on the data used. Therefore, I use 
different data sources (Section 5.3.1 and Section 5.3.2) and the extensions from Section 4 
(Section 5.3.3 and Section 5.3.4) to check for the sensitivity of γ*. The main finding of this 
section is that the percentage difference found in the calibration of the basic model is not 
sensitive to changes in the data sources. The size of the labour market, though influences the 
effect substantially. 
5.3.1  The effect of changes in the outflow rate and the contact rate (η) 
In calculating the outflow rate, I did not distinguish between the various channels used for 
mediating unemployed. However, in reality the CWI is not involved in all matches. If the 
outflow rate of the CWI differs from the average, this has an influence on the contact rate. 
Therefore, I use information about the effectiveness of the CWI to see what happens to γ*.  
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Lindeboom and Van Ours (1997) present in their paper a contact rate.
29 The contact rate they 
have found for the PES is 2.5% per week, which is lower than 11.5% per week found in Section 
5.2.3. A weekly contact rate of 2.5% is equivalent to a contact rate of 15.0% per 6.5 weeks 
compared to 52.7% in Section 5.2.3. Using η = 0.025 and α = 0.2982, the resulting weekly 
outflow rate would be around 1.2%, which is not in accordance with the observed outflow rates. 
Either the contact rate or the matching probability based on the data of Lindeboom and Van 
Ours is too low. So using the direct measure or the contact rate from Lindeboom and Van Ours 
(1997) does not give a satisfying result nor does it give a reason not to continue with the contact 
rate found in Section 5.2.3. An explanation for the lower outflow rates found on the basis of the 
data of Lindeboom and Van Ours is that the labour market situation in the period on which their 
data is based in different from the current labour market situation: unemployment was much 
higher in the 1980s and the early 1990s. Still, the percentage difference between γ* and η has 
not changed much: now it is about 45%. 
5.3.2  The effect of changes in the offer-acceptance probability (α) 
Suppose that the unemployed in the municipalities have such characteristics that it is difficult to 
match them or that the vacancies require skills that only few unemployed have. This implies 
that the offer-acceptance probability falls. What is the effect of a fall in α on γ*? 
Reducing α - and changing consequently δ and η, since these variables are based on α - does 
not change the relative gap between γ* and η much. For example, a decrease in α from 0.2982 
to 0.2 decreases the percentage difference between γ* and η only from 37% to 36%. 
This result supports the finding in Section 3.4.2.1, where I have proven that the 
attractiveness of the PES decreases if α decreases from an intermediate value. So, in a region 
where the municipalities face a more problematic matching situation, the attractiveness of the 
PES increases. The PES is better equipped to operate in a labour market where there is a 
mismatch between unemployed and vacancies. 
5.3.3  The effect of cooperation 
In using the equation for γ* I compared the welfare level in the setup with a PES with the 
welfare level in the setup where the municipalities provide the employment service but do not 
cooperate. What happens to the percentage difference between γ* and η if the municipalities 
cooperate by sharing their unused vacancies? 
Equation (3.2) and Equation (3.4) are the expressions for welfare in the setup without a PES 
where the municipalities cooperate and welfare in the setup with a PES, respectively. By 
plugging in the equation for γ* the values of the variables from Section 5.2, I find that for γ* = 
0.62 the welfare levels are the same. This implies a percentage difference between γ* and η of 
about 18% compared to 37% if the municipalities do not cooperate. 
 
29 Lindeboom and Van Ours (1997, p.97)  
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So if the municipalities share their unused vacancies, the municipalities do not have to be 37% 
more effective in searching for vacancies, but only 18% in order to yield equal welfare in both 
setups. The reason is that the municipalities can reap part of the benefits of the regional labour 
market. 
5.3.4  The effect of the size of the labour market 
As explained in Section 4.2, if the municipalities have many unemployed and vacancies, they 
form a regional labour market in themselves. Therefore, it is important to note that the 
advantage of the common pool, which was estimated to be around 37% in Section 5.2, is 
smaller for larger municipalities. Large municipalities can gain from multiple meetings and a 
higher matching probability just as the PES can. In fact, the 37% estimate is based on a model 
with only two unemployed and vacancies. Since in reality there is no municipality with such a 
small labour market, this estimate should be regarded as an upper limit of the advantage of the 
PES. The exact difference between the advantage of the common pool for the PES and for the 
municipalities depends on the size of the labour market in the municipalities.  
5.4  Conclusion 
In this section I have illustrated how to calibrate the model in Section 0. The calibration is a 
first, back-of-the-envelope calculation of the advantage of the PES which stems from its 
regional labour market function. Comparing the values of contact rates of the PES and the 
municipalities, η and γ*, found in the different analyses gives an impression of the value of the 
regional labour market. Table 5.1 gives an overview.  
Table 5.1  Values for η, γ* and the percentage difference 
  η  γ*  Percentage difference 
       
Basic  0.53  0.72  37.3 
Only 1999-2006 data  0.52  0.72  37.5 
Contact rate from Lindeboom and Van Ours  0.15  0.22  44.5 
Larger labour market  0.53  between 0.53 and 0.72  between 0 and 37.3 
Smaller α  0.65  0.88  35.9 
Cooperation  0.53  0.62  17.9 
 
My calibration indicates that the advantage of the PES is substantial: about 37%. So the 
regional labour market, formed by the PES, yields 37% more matches than if the municipalities 
provide the employment services.  
What stands out from the various calibrations is that the percentage difference is rather 
stable round 37%. Only if the municipalities cooperate by sharing their vacancies the advantage  
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of the PES is about half of the advantage compared to the case where the municipalities do not 
cooperate.   
This result of the calibration should be interpreted with care. The aim is not to give a 
framework on which policymakers can decide, but merely to give an impression of the 
usefulness of the model and of the size of the effects which I have modelled by means of a 
back-of-the-envelope calibration. The model deals only with a part of the discussion about the 
social security system in the Netherlands. Furthermore, since the calibration tries to bridge the 
gap between the real world and a stylised model based on simplifying assumptions, the 
reliability of the prediction cannot be assured without econometric tests. A question which still 
has to be answered is the precise effect of the size of the labour market. If the municipalities 
have many unemployed and vacancies, the municipalities form a regional labour market on 
their own and the presumed advantage of the PES virtually disappears. In this respect the 37% 
estimate of the value of a regional labour market should be seen as an upper limit.  
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6  Conclusion 
6.1  Summary 
In this thesis I have studied one of the dilemmas in the current organisation of the social 
security system in the Netherlands. On the one hand, the public employment office CWI  
facilitates the regional labour market, but it has no strong incentives to exert the optimal 
mediation effort. On the other hand, municipalities have incentives to reduce unemployment, 
but without a regional employment office the municipalities may not coordinate their mediation 
efforts and the regional labour market may not function. Therefore, there is a trade off between 
incentives and coordination - the central question being whether mediation by the municipalities 
or by the CWI will lead to higher welfare. 
Although there is a substantial body of literature on incentives and decentralisation and on 
search and matching models, this thesis is the first paper that explicitly explores the regional 
role of the employment office. In particular, I have developed a game theoretical one-period 
model with two municipalities in which I model the incentive effects and the value of a regional 
labour market. First I have proven that in the absence of a regional employment office the 
municipalities will not create a regional labour market, in the sense that they do not exchange 
vacancies and unemployed. Next, I have constructed an expression which states under which 
circumstances the CWI or the municipalities should perform the mediation role. The key trade 
off is between the higher search efficacy of the municipalities and the higher matching 
probability of the CWI. Furthermore, I have extended the model to add some more realism to 
the analysis. On the one hand cooperation between the municipalities and a larger size of the 
local labour market decrease the advantage of the CWI. On the other hand, economies of scale 
in search costs enhance the role of the CWI. 
To get an impression of the effects of the regional labour market on welfare I have 
calibrated the model. In the context of my basic model the advantage of the regional labour 
market is substantial. The municipalities should be about 37% more effective in searching for 
vacancies to yield the same welfare as the CWI. This percentage should be considered as a first 
trial and an upper limit, since the extensions have shown that the precise value depends in 
particular on the size of the municipalities. 
6.2  Directions for Future Research 
My research is the first attempt to model the CWI as an institution to facilitate the regional 
labour market. Several issues can supplement my research to enrich the analysis and to increase 
the realism of my model.   
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The model does not quantify the limited advantage of the CWI if a municipality is large and 
forms a regional labour market on its own and thus already benefits from a common pool 
advantage without a CWI. So the advantages of the CWI are likely to be nullified if the 
municipality is very large. Instead of a model with only two unemployed and vacancies, the 
model can be extended by adding multiple unemployed and vacancies to test this conjecture. 
Another element which is worthwhile to explore in depth is the variation in unemployment 
rates between municipalities. Variation in unemployment rates might make the CWI more 
attractive. On the one hand, the municipality with the lowest unemployment rate now prefers to 
perform the mediation task itself, because participation in the common pool reduces the 
probability the vacancy is left until the next period. On the other hand, this disadvantage is 
counteracted by the advantage of the municipality with the highest unemployment rate, which 
consists of a higher matching probability. 
The model does not allow the CWI and the municipalities simultaneously searching for 
vacancies. Since we have seen that the CWI does not exert the optimal search effort, it might 
occur that the municipalities will search for vacancies themselves as well. This might lead to 
advantageous effects which stem from the increased probability of finding a vacancy. The 
decreasing importance of the regional labour market is a disadvantage, because vacancies found 
by the municipalities will not be shared. The role of fixed search costs is relevant in this 
context, since these may prevent the municipalities from starting to search and thus avoid a 
welfare deteriorating outcome. 
My model implicitly takes into account the heterogeneity in skills of workers and in 
requirements for jobs in the sense that not every meeting results in a match. However, the 
heterogeneity of workers may give an additional benefit to the CWI, since the CWI allows for 
more meetings between unemployed and firms. Thus we might expect that the matched 
applicant will better fit to the job and is more productive. An extension aimed at quantifying 
this effect might therefore be considered. 
Instead of focusing on the difference in search effort, I could have focused on the difference 
in stimulating the unemployed to contact firms with existing vacancies. The municipalities have 
a higher incentive to stimulate the unemployed to contact the firms with vacancies. So the 
contact rate of the municipalities is higher than the contact rate of the CWI. Thus this approach 
does not substantially differ from the approach focusing on search effort and, therefore, the 
implications are the same. 
Lastly, the model considers one important element of the discussion about the structure of 
the social security system of the Netherlands. Still, other arguments may be relevant as well. 
For example, a decision on the choice of the institutional design cannot do without an analysis 
of the fixed costs of searching. My model gives a first hint that the CWI may have scale 
advantages, but further analysis is needed for a full comparison between the CWI and the 
municipalities.  
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6.3  Policy Options 
In the model considered there is a trade off between incentives and a well functioning labour 
market: only one of the two goals can be reached. However, if the settings are changed, this 
does not have to be the case. I present some options which combine the goals of incentives and 
regional coordination. 
The first option is to let the municipalities or the central government negotiate with the CWI 
on a performance contract. The role of the CWI as a facilitator of the regional labour market is 
preserved, while the incentives and the responsibility to provide employment services are well 
aligned. If the CWI is the only party with a network of contacts, such performance contract 
could yield higher welfare than an auction. Still, the performance contract may yield only a 
second-best outcome if it impossible to draw up a perfect contract which accounts for all 
possible contingencies, for example the impact of the business cycle on the performance of the 
CWI. If the municipalities negotiate with the CWI on the performance contract, coordination 
problems between municipalities might arise. If the central government negotiates with the 
CWI on the contract, it is difficult to take local conditions into account. 
The second option is to privatise the CWI and auction licenses to license to mediate. The 
winner of the auction has the responsibility for both searching and matching. In this way the 
incentives are passed through from the municipalities to the private employment office and the 
employment office will exert the optimal search effort. At the same time the license holder will 
create a regional labour market, since the regional labour market maximises the outflow from 
unemployment. An important requirement for a successful auction is that the bidders operate on 
a level playing field. The CWI should not be the only bidder with specific knowledge of the 
labour market. Since in the Dutch labour market there are multiple employment agencies which 
already have a network of contacts, for example the re-integration agencies and temporary 
employment offices, this could be a promising avenue for future exploration. 
The final option is to give the responsibility to provide the employment services to the 
municipalities. To be welfare increasing though, the municipalities should not foresee an end to 
their interactions and the municipalities should still be more effective in searching for 
vacancies, since the regional labour market the municipalities would form leads to a lower 
probability of matching than the regional labour market the CWI constitutes. 
Several issues complicate the design of an alternative mechanism. I mention these issues 
only briefly. First, the position of the UWV
30. The CWI does not only provide the employment 
services for the municipalities, but also for the UWV. The UWV has no such financial 
incentives to reduce unemployment as the municipalities. Second, it has to be taken into 
account whether the municipalities will cooperate in contracting or auctioning the mediation 
task. Thirdly, one of the goals of the social security act SUWI was to prevent that benefit 
 
30 See for more information on the UWV  the box “SUWI & CWI” in Section 1.  
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applicants would have to go to several organisations to apply for benefits and mediation. The 
alternatives presented above may conflict with this goal and need attention in the discussion 
about the appropriate mechanism.  
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8  Appendix 
8.1  The Setup without and with a PES 
The extensive form shown in Figure 8.1 leads to the welfare level in the setup without a PES 
displayed in Equation (3.1). The welfare level is the sum of the expected payoffs for all possible 
outcomes given the choice of the municipalities. 
The encircled N stands for Nature. M1 and M2 stand for Municipality 1 and 2, respectively. 
The dotted ellipse round the nodes of M2 means that the municipalities choose simultaneously. 
Although M2 chooses later on in the diagram, it does not know what M1 has chosen. The 
payoffs for every outcome are shown at the right of the end nodes. The first term between 
brackets is the payoff for the first municipality, the second term is the payoff for the second 
municipality. 
The extensive form shown in Figure 8.2 leads to the welfare level in the setup with a PES in 
Equation (3.4). However, Figure 8.2 only shows the outcome tree in extended form if there are 
two vacancies found. The payoff for each outcome is between brackets, to the right of the end 
nodes where the first number between the brackets is the value of the unused vacancies, the 
second number is the payoff for Municipality 1 and the third number is the payoff for 
Municipality 2.  
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Figure 8.2  The setup with a PES 
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8.2  The value of δ 
In Section 0 I assumed that the value of a vacancy which is not used during the current period is 
constant. Since my model is a static model, I have not explicitly modelled the next period. 
Therefore, I could not say anything about the value of δ except that 0 < δ < 1. It was no problem 
that I did not know the value of δ, since I could still prove that the municipalities will never 
share their unused vacancies. 
For the calibration of the model I need a numerical value of δ to estimate γ*. However, there 
are no data for the value of δ. Therefore, I have to find an alternative way to calculate the value 
of δ. I estimate δ in the following way. 
δ is the expected payoff in the next period of a vacancy not used during the current period. It 
is the product of the probability the vacancy leads to the saving of a social benefit times the 
amount of this saving. The amount of the saving is 1. The probability that this amount will be 
saved depends on the setup (PES or no PES) and the assumptions made about the next period. 
I assume the following: 
·  The values of the parameters in the current period, α, γ and η, are the same in the next period. 
·  Regardless of whether the PES or the municipality has an unused vacancy left at the beginning 
of the next period, they will search for vacancies again. 
·  The unemployed will first meet the vacancies which are found during the current period. Only if 
the meeting is not a success there will be a meeting between the unemployed and the unused 
vacancy.
31 
·  A vacancy can be kept for only one period. So after two periods, the firms try to find a worker 
via different means. 
In sum: 1) The game as described in Section 3.2.1 and 3.3.1 is played again. 2) At the end of 
the game the unemployed who have not found a job during the second period can meet the 
vacancy from the first period. 
Furthermore, the value of δ depends on the setup. Since with a PES the labour market works 
different than without a PES, the probability a vacancy will be of use is different as well. 
I have proven in Section 3.2.2 that the municipalities will never share their vacancies. So 
Stage 2 and 3 of the game never occur. What is left is not a game but an outcome tree. The two 
municipalities do not interact with each other. In Section 3.3 we have seen that the probability 
an unemployed does not find a job is larger in the setup without a PES than with a PES. So in 
the setup without a PES the probability the kept vacancy will be used for a meeting is larger. 
Therefore, the value of δ is larger for the setup without a PES. 
 
31 Alternatively, I could assume that unemployed first met vacancies from the previous period. However, this gives a less 
nice expression for δ.  
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Here I only present the value of δ in the setup without a PES, since the value of δ in the setup 
with a PES cannot be solved in a straightforward way. 
The outcome tree for the setup without a PES is displayed in Figure 8.3. This is the outcome 
tree for one of the agents. The outcome tree for the other agents is similar. v
j denotes the 
vacancy found in period j. If the unemployed is matched to v
2, the payoff is zero and v
1 is not 
needed. Since it cannot be used in the third period, it has no value anymore. If the unemployed 
is not matched to v
2, he will meet v
1.  














In two cases the kept vacancy leads to a saving of the social benefit. The first case is where a 
vacancy is found but the meeting between unemployed and vacancy does not result in a match. 
The second is where no vacancy is found. The probability that these cases happen is γ(1-α) + 
(1-γ). So the value of an unused vacancy in the setup without a PES is: 
( ) ( )a g a a g d - + - = 1 1 PES No    
Again, the value of δ in the setup with a PES is smaller. I estimate an average δ by using the 
fact that η≤γ: 
( ) ( )a h a a h d - + - = 1 1   (8.1) 
I will use Equation (8.1) to estimate the value of γ*.  
 